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Abstract 
The Internet of Things has already demonstrated clear 
benefits when applied in many areas. In connected and 
autonomous vehicles (CAV), IoT data can help the 
autonomous systems make better decisions for safer and more 
secure transportation. For example, different IoT data sources 
can extend &$9¶V risk awareness, while the incoming data 
can update these risks in real-time for faster reactions that 
may mitigate possible damages. However, the current state of 
the art CAV research has not addressed this matter well 
enough. This paper proposes a profile-driven approach to 
manage IoT data in the context of CAV systems through a 
dynamic risk management framework. Unlike the current 
inflexible risk assessment strategies, the framework 
encourages more flexible investigation of risks through 
different risk profiles, each representing risk knowledge 
through a set of risk input considerations, assessment methods 
and optimal reaction strategies. As the risks change frequently 
with time and location, there will be no single profile that can 
cover all the risks that CAVs face on the road. The uses of 
different risk profiles, therefore can help interested parties to 
better understand the risks and adapt to various situations 
appropriately. Our framework includes the effective 
management of IoT data sources to enable the run-time risk 
assessment. We also describe a case study of using the 
proposed framework to manage the risks for the POD being 
developed in the Innovate UK-funded CAPRI project.   
1 Introduction 
The Internet of Things (IoT) is a major trend that is set to 
shape the development of the second digital revolution by 
FRQQHFWLQJ³HYHU\WKLQJ´WRWKH,QWHUQHW:LWKWKHFDSDELOLW\RI
gathering useful data from different sources, IoT has been 
having strong implications in a wide range of areas such as 
the smart home, the smart city, industrial systems, agriculture, 
health, and so on. In particular, it has become a key enabler 
for the development of intelligent transport systems (ITS) [1, 
2]. IoT devices are being embedded in a wide range of 
transportation components such as in-vehicle networks, road-
side infrastructures, environment and in vehicle-to-vehicle 
(V2V) communication. Data gathered from these sources will 
form the big picture of the internal state of a vehicle, as well 
as its connections and interactions with surroundings, which 
enable drivers to make smarter decisions for safer and more 
secure driving.  
 
Driving decision-support enabled by understanding the 
YHKLFOH¶V LQWHUQDO DQG H[WHUQDO HQYLURQPHQWV LV WKH FHQWUDO
objective of connected and autonomous vehicles (CAVs). The 
Society of Automotive Engineers has defined levels of 
autonomy from 0 to 5 [3]. At the highest level, the vehicle is 
expected to take the place of the driver to make all the driving 
decisions. CAV technology can solve many long-term 
transportation issues such as reducing the traffic congestions 
that have become more and more popular due to the fast-
growing urbanisation; providing safer transportation by 
preventing accidents; and improving traffic signal controls 
and fleet managements [3]. These benefits motivate the 
investments from industry, academia, and governments, 
which expect to boost the CAV market to 131.9 billion USD 
in 2019 [3]. 
 
A lot of attempts have been made to improve the driving 
decision-support using transportation data. Several offline 
road accident databases (e.g. [4]) are available to analyse 
factors that affect road safety. Soon, IoT will outperform 
these databases as they can both record a greater deal of 
important information (e.g. in-car information gathered 
through sensors, surrounding data coming from road 
operators and other vehicles, etc.) and provide them in a 
timely fashion to reflect the most recent driving situation. IoT 
data can bring many benefits such as improving the risk 
assessment from multiple perspectives and detecting the run-
time dangers to mitigate potential damages [2]. However, 
applying IoT data effectively for such benefits is not well-
addressed yet in the literature. For example, current safety 
and security standards and practices mainly classify the static 
risks based on the vehicle¶V assets, therefore without 
considering other IoT data sources. These risk assessments 
are also not updated frequently, so they will not be able to 
adapt quickly to newly discovered risks. Recently several 
attempts have been made to analyse the road safety in real-
time based on multiple data sources, however, there is still a 
lack of a flexible theoretical risk management framework to 
apply to wider situations. A common challenge that such 
attempts face is the management of IoT data, which are huge, 
unreliable and incomplete [5].  
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This paper tackles the issues of managing IoT data in 
assessing CAV risks by proposing a profile-driven risk 
management framework. Overall, our approach drives the IoT 
data into several predefined risk profiles that are most 
rHOHYDQWWRXVHUV¶VFHQDULRV,R7GDWDDUHILUVWXVHGWRWUDLQWKH
preferred risk assessment model in each profile. After the 
training period, the coming data will be employed as the 
inputs of the model to derive the risk assessment output. In 
more details, the framework consists of two phases: the 
design and operation phases. In the design phase, a reference 
library of risk profiles is developed based on the best 
standards, practices, and literature. Each profile clarifies the 
risk interests, available data sources to monitor, options of 
assessment methods, and recommendations of situations in 
which this profile should be employed. When using the 
framework, upon the needs and views of the operators, 
several profiles will be chosen with configurations of relevant 
data sources and assessment methods. In the operation phases, 
the data are first used to train the risk assessment model of 
each chosen profile. Data sources are also filtered and cleaned 
for more reliable evaluations. After the training, the resulting 
data will be used as inputs for the assessment models to 
obtain the run-time risk output. The training procedure will be 
repeated when condition-to-update are satisfied, for example, 
when there are more than a certain amount of new incoming 
data, or when there are changes in the initial assumptions of 
the model. The re-training cycle aims at updating the model 
for more accurate assessments.  
 
The benefits of this approach can be multi-fold:  
x The decision-making is supported by more relevant data 
sources.  The assessment will therefore be more accurate, 
while the training process will become faster and more 
flexible, due to the reduction of data and features to 
monitor. 
x The risk profiles represent risks from different aspects of 
interest to users, and hence can provide more information 
and improve the decisions¶TXDOLW\.  
x Users receive the output faster and understand the 
assessment more precisely, which means they are more 
aware of the situational risks and can react better to 
mitigate the damages.  
 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 introduces the 
background and review the related work that consider the 
application of IoT in CAV risk management. Section 3 
discusses the requirements and challenges for the dynamic 
risk assessment framework. Section 4 presents the proposed 
solution, while Section 5 introduces a relevant case study of 
the POD. Section 6 concludes the paper and considers the 
future work. 
2 Background and Related Work 
Risk management is the process of identifying the most likely 
and dangerous risks in order to mitigate them in advance [6]. 
When the level of CAV autonomy evolves, there will be more 
and more new safety and security risks coming together with 
the modern technologies they employ. Risk management 
therefore has become crucial to ensure the public acceptances 
of CAV.   
 
Despite the importance of CAV risk management, standard 
and practice development is only at the initial stage. 
Prominent guidelines are the ISO 26262 [7] which considers 
the functional safety of on-board electrical and electronic 
systems [8]; the J3061 [9] and the NHTSA [10, 11] 
guidebooks that focuses on the security of cyber-physical 
vehicle systems. A common theme in such guidelines is the 
use of four main phases: asset identification to understand the 
objects to protect, threat modelling which focuses on the 
DGYHUVDULHV¶FDSDELOLWies, risk analysis to justify the potential 
risks, and finally the mitigation plan for risk detection and 
reaction [12]. This theme is inflexible and limited in dealing 
with the dynamic risk environment of CAVs. Moreover, it 
does not consider the involvement of other available data 
sources in improving the understanding of the security and 
safety of such systems. 
 
Evaluating the risks continuously and readily getting the best 
reactions are vital for CAVs, given that the risks they face on 
roads changes frequently and rapidly. Cheng et al. [13] 
assessed the risks at run-time by gathering data from sources 
such as the in-vehicle sensors, the vehicle state and the 
driver¶V behaviours. Authors in [14] used object tracking and 
classification, traffic management communication, and driver 
intention to assess the risk dynamically for vehicles at 
intersections. A real-life project developed by the Tennessee 
+LJKZD\3DWURORIILFHUVXVHGDVRIWZDUHPRGHOFDOOHG³&UDVK
5HGXFWLRQ $QDO\VLQJ 6WDWLVWLFDO +LVWRU\´ &5$6+ WR
predict the accidents in an area of five by six squared miles 
for four-hour periods each day. The prediction results were 
sent to help drivers to make better on-road decisions. The 
model took into consideration a wide range of impact factors 
such as sporting events, weather patterns, alcohol selling 
points (assumed that some drivers nearby will be affected by 
alcohol or drugs), accident history and so on. The software 
was claimed to have an accuracy rate of 72% and reduce the 
Tennessee traffic fatalities of 5.5% [15].  
 
A common issue with the current CAV risk assessment 
approaches is that they may miss some unknown factors 
which lead to unforeseen risks. For example, many models 
missed the traffic changes in the peak hours, or road condition 
updates. Such unknown risk factors may significantly affect 
the fixed model of the current approaches. Other issues that 
were not addressed are the data selection for training the 
model and decision on when the model needs to be updated, 
especially when the upcoming data reflect changes that are 
not covered in the current model.   
 
A framework to manage the IoT dataflow on the CAV risk 
management lifecycle is needed to form better knowledge of 
risks from the gathered data. In [16], the authors suggested a 
knowledge-on-the-loop model to acquire risk knowledge by 
monitoring the system rationale flows continuously from 
design-time to post-deployment time and back. This 
framework supports the automated knowledge inference and 
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enrichment by using the Electronic Architecture and Software 
Technology ± Architecture Description Language (EAST-
ADL) to represent the knowledge; and the inference engine 
for automated reasoning and self-adaptation at post-
deployment time. 
 
For easy management, the risk data can be clustered and 
recorded into relevant profiles. The work in [17] uses the k-
means cluster method to classify the situations in different 
road profiles. Such classifications were claimed to build a 
better dissemination strategy, which send the warning 
messages to all vehicle faster and more effectively. Authors in 
[18] also suggested the use of vehicle profiles, each 
represented by a history trust list and a friend list, to build a 
better trust management framework between vehicles. 
 
3 Requirements and Challenges for Developing 
a Dynamic Risk Assessment Framework 
CAVs operate on highly dynamic environments which 
contain frequent changes of threats, vulnerabilities, and 
technologies, while involving varied missions and functions. 
As a result, a dynamic risk management framework is 
essential to help the system adapt quickly to this unstable 
environment. Ideally, the framework should take advantages 
of the data coming from different IoT sources that can 
provide valuable risk information for a more accurate 
analysis. According to the NHTSA guideline [11], this 
framework also needs to be life-cycle based, and revisiting 
various tasks overtime depending on the changes of the 
information system and the environments. Moreover, the 
framework needs to keep monitoring the employed security 
controls over time to update the system¶V security state, while 
maintaining the initial security authorisation. The main 
challenges that this framework faces to satisfy these 
requirements are as follows.  
3.1 Challenges from Managing the Gathered Big Data 
Due to the large number of IoT sources and their sizes, the 
risk management framework will face the challenges of 
managing the big data gathered from such sources. Effective 
management should consider the characteristics of big data, 
which are different from traditional data. In fact, they are 
distinguished by the following factors: greater volume, 
variety (various types of data), velocity (produce, generate 
and analyse rapidly), value (low density but huge value), 
variability (inconsistency of data), and veracity (varied 
quality) [19]. The challenges in more details are:  
x Dealing with heterogeneous data: data needs to be 
represented with the right metadata, which should be 
attached with provenance through the processing 
pipelines to trace any processing error happening along 
the dataflow [5]. 
x Eliminating inconsistency and incompleteness: the 
system must manage the data uncertainty, errors, and 
missing values to increase its data reliability. The volume 
and redundancy of big data can also be used in 
compensating missing data, verifying the conflicting 
cases, validating the trustworthy relationships, or finding 
the inherent clusters as well as relationships and models 
[5]. 
x Reducing data scale for more efficient processing: the 
large scale of gathered data leads to higher cost of 
storage and processing. On the other hand, for each risk 
assessment category, only a selected number of features 
and data are relevant. Therefore, the big data 
management needs to determine an effective way of 
selecting only the relevant data for the specified risk 
assessment interests. This will help to improve the data 
storage in a cost-effective manner. 
x Providing risk analysis in run-time: the decision making 
in run-time may involve the complex queries on high 
volumes of data. To reduce the response time, data 
should be organised in an optimal way such as indexing 
or clustering in advance, based on careful specifications 
of the query needs.  
3.2 Challenges from Managing the Risks at Different 
System Levels 
Different system levels will have varied concerns and views 
on risk assessment. As a result, monitoring data and the 
assessment approaches for each level should be selected 
according to the corresponding concerns and views. Common 
CAV levels regarding risk managements are:  
x In vehicle level: focuses on the safety and security risk 
assessment of the vehicle and other vehicles around.  
x Road sign level: focuses on managing the safety and 
security of a local area, mainly by monitoring the traffic 
flow and other information sources that report specific 
properties of the situation along the road. 
x Area traffic management level: the operator needs to 
understand how the local risks from one area can affect 
to the global risks of a larger area.   
x Producer level: the producer need to assess the security 
and safety risk to improve the designs of their products. 
3.3 Challenges from Understanding the Risks Deeper 
from Different Aspects 
The gathered data can be used to obtain the risk assessment in 
different domains, such as:  
x System functional and technical safety requirements: the 
system needs to monitor and analyse data related to the 
functional boundary and safe states to quickly detect 
potential hazards. 
x System security requirements: the system needs to 
understand the security assets, attacks and consequences 
towards them. This will help to detect and react quickly 
with the security risks.  
x Situation awareness: The collected information will be 
analysed to improve the situational awareness from 
different angles to achieve the global views, which later 
will lead to more accurate analysis. 
 
4 
4 Proposed Dynamic Risk Management 
Framework  
In this section, we propose a dynamic risk assessment 
framework to manage the IoT data effectively for the 
evaluation of CAV risks. Instead of considering risks with a 
predefined set of threats and elements, our framework 
manages risks through profiles, each containing risk 
information of a specific aspect that relates WR XVHUV¶ YLHZV
and needs. A risk profile of an object reflects its current risk 
knowledge, which are formed through relevant collected data 
and assessment methods. The profile can be updated to reflect 
situation changes by analysing the monitoring data or 
advances in theoretical assessment methodologies. It also 
guides the reaction strategies for the risk assessment results, 
for example, suggesting best countermeasures (e.g. 
reconfiguring the protection, applying stricter encryption and 
security policies, etc.) for each type of results. Risk 
management authorities will collect and manage different risk 
profiles in a library and distribute the relevant profiles to 
users, either by broadcasting or on-request. In transportation, 
depending on risk awareness and needs, transporters can 
request relevant risk profiles to form their own risk 
assessment model. This model will consider only a limited 
number of IoT input sources filtered by the chosen profiles, 
hence it will assess the risk faster and provide more 
understandable results to users. Moreover, when accidents 
happen, road operators can broadcast similar profiles for other 
transporters to help them react faster and with an optimal 
strategy.  
 
The framework consists of two main phases: the design phase 
and the operation phase, as can be seen in Fig. 1. The design 
phase involves analysing the related standards, practices, 
guidelines, and risk literature that form the risk knowledge 
represented by risk profiles. Each profile includes a specific 
set of metrics and features, and assessment models, 
differentiated by safety and security views and needs. 
Available and relevant IoT data will be selected to train the 
risk assessment models. After the training, the model is ready 
to derive assessment results when the new data arrive. In the 
operation phase, first CAVs will collect the risk profiles that 
are most relevant to their situations. They will also configure 
the data sources and assessment method in each profile. When 
CAVs are on the road, IoT data from pre-configured sources 
will be fed to the assessment model to answer the risk 
concerns in a way that is most meaningful for the users. 
Incident information will be also updated by road operators to 
help CAVs react better in run-time conditions. Inaccurate 
assessment result will be reported and reviewed to improve 
the risk understanding and optimise risk profiles. The reviews 
and updates will be done in cycle to adapt to the changes of 
the real world transportations. 
 
The framework will develop the risk knowledge constantly 
through the risk profiles by the four steps shown in Fig. 1, 
which are elaborated further in the following paragraphs. 
 4.1 Risk Profile Justification  
First, a comprehensive list of risk profiles is formed by 
reviewing the security practices, standards, and relevant risk 
literature. This list is re-reviewed frequently upon the 
literature update. As a result, the list is not fixed, but it can be 
either extended or eliminated. At high-level, each profile 
represents the risk knowledge of an aspect that users wish to 
use. At low-level, the profile contains a set of descriptions for 
requirements, metrics, assessment methods and 
recommendations of situations that are useful to employ.  
 
In practice, users can select a set of profiles following their 
risk views and needs based on the guidelines from the profiles 
library. The justified set will identify the data sources that 
need to be monitored, and use these sources to derive on-road 
risk assessment results for users. CAV producers can extend 
XVHUV¶ SURILOH FKRLces by providing plug-n-play risk 
management modules, which are devices that collect 
information for assessing specific risks. 
4.2 Risk Assessment Model Selection and Training 
Knowledge of risk assessment models (e.g. form and meaning 
of results, pros and cons of methods) will be made available 
for users so they can choose the best suitable models for their 
purposes. For instance, some users may prefer a quantitative 
assessment model because it is easier to compare and rank 
different risks, while others think the qualitative models give 
more understandable results.  
 
After the models are selected, IoT data will be filtered, pre-
processed and used to train the model. To ensure adequate 
levels of accuracy, the models need to consider the size and 
quality of data. For example, data should be cross-checked for 
reliability, should be continuously updated for changing 
transport conditions, or in case of missing and unreliable data, 
the model should check from other available sources. At the 
end of this procedure, the model is ready to give assessment 
results up on incoming data.  
54.3 Adaptive and Run-time Security Monitoring 
Users can obtain run-time risk assessment results when the 
upcoming IoT data are fed to the justified models. The results 
are presented in a form that is most understandable for users, 
while different risk profiles provide the views of system risks 
from different angles, therefore the framework can bring a 
deeper and more accurate risk awareness. In case abnormal 
risks are observed, users can follow suggestions on optimal 
reaction strategies provided in the profiles to adapt to the 
situation. In incident scenarios, the user reactions can be 
recorded for reviewing and learning to further improve the 
risk profiles.  
4.4 Model Evaluation, Validation and Update  
The selected risk profiles can be evaluated and validated 
based on the real-time operations of the system. For each type 
of situation, different risk profiles can be compared in terms 
of accuracy and efficiency to rank for recommendations. 
When a risk model provides inaccurate or unreliable 
assessment results, the relevant update IoT data will be used 
to re-train the models, subject to sufficient data size and data 
quality. 
5 Case Study: Dynamic Risk Management 
Framework for the PODs 
In this section, we present a case study that applies the 
proposed framework to manage safety and security risks in 
our CAPRI (Connected & Autonomous POD on-Road 
Implementation) project, which is tasked with the 
development of the ³SRGV-on-GHPDQG´ 32' W\SH RI 
services. Examples of the services include using the 
autonomous PODs to move passengers around fixed areas 
such as airports, shopping centres, or parks. Unlike the 
current PODs which operate by following white lines and 
evading obstacles [20], the PODs we are developing aim at 
better awareness of surrounding situations, hence become 
more flexible and adaptable in on-road decision making.  
 
Security and safety risk management of such PODs is crucial 
in gaining public acceptance prior to their commercial 
release. The PODs are supposed to operate in public and 
uncontrolled environments so they will need detailed risk 
assessments and reaction processes to avoid unexpected 
situations. For the first phase, we developed a risk profile 
database as a knowledge platform to cover as many real-
world risk situations as possible. We specify important assets 
and elements in operations and review relevant attacks on 
such objects. In particular, we focus on internal POD assets, 
cooperative communication from POD to POD, 
communication between PODs and fixed infrastructure such 
as road signs, and between PODs and the cloud-based traffic 
infrastructure management system. The communication 
architecture of the POD system is essentially an IoT-based 
system, where the data are constantly gathered from internal 
POD sensors, road infrastructure, and other sources that 
gather information such as weather and surrounding traffic. 
The operational data of PODs through time are stored in the 
cloud, which enables the learning and training needed for the 
risk analysis and prediction models.  
 
We also review the relevant safety and security attacks that 
relate to the assets. For example, Petit et al. [21] reviews the 
potential attack surface of CAV associated with both the 
internal technology of the vehicles and their communication 
with external elements. Studies that GLVFXVV WKH YHKLFOHV¶
attack surface can be found, for example, in [22-29]. Petit et 
al. [30] also investigate the remote attacks on camera and 
Lidar system. Chen et al. [31] assess the contactless attacks 
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RQYHKLFOHV¶VHQVRUVWKDW are used to guide the driving, such as 
millimetre-wave radars, ultrasonic sensors, forward-looking 
cameras by using off-the-shelf hardware. These attacks 
seriously affect the safety functions of such vehicles by 
blocking their vision and causing them to malfunction. Zhang 
et al. [32] considers the malware issue and its 
countermeasures. Amozahed et al. [33] assesses the effects of 
security attacks on the communication channel and sensors to 
create instability in the operation of a connected vehicle 
stream.  
 
Overall risk assessment techniques can be classified mainly in 
three categories: quantitative, qualitative, and hybrid. The 
quantitative approach uses probability and statistics theory to 
assess the risk likelihood in numerical form, for example, 
using probabilistic models, such as Bayesian Networks, or 
machine learning models. These methods can provide a clear 
and concise estimation of the risks; however, they require 
certain amount of historical GDWDZKLFKDUHQRUPDOO\GLI¿FXOW
to collect. The qualitative approaches, on the other hand, rely 
on expert opinions for providing qualitative outputs in state 
form (i.e. High, Medium, Low). Specific examples include 
the FAIR framework [34], attack tree analysis [35], and Fault 
tree analysis [36]. Their main advantages are their reliability, 
as they involve expert reasoning, and understandability. 
However, the categorisation is vague and cannot be used to 
rank large numbers of threats. The hybrid models try to 
combine the advantages of quantitative and qualitative 
methods and reduce their drawbacks, for example, giving 
numerical assessment for risks in the same qualitative 
category [37]. Upon understanding different assessment 
approaches, we suggest the most suitable and efficient risk 
model for each profile.  
 
We further obtain risk information for each profile from 
different security and safety standards, practices, guidelines, 
and work from other relevant projects, such as the E-Safety 
Vehicle Intrusion Protected Applications (EVITA) project 
[38], ETSI Threat, Vulnerability, and implementation Risk 
Analysis (TVRA) standard [39], Operationally Critical 
Threat, Asset, and Vulnerability Evaluation (OCTAVE) [40], 
ISO26262 [7], NHTSA [10, 11], J3061 [35]. 
Recommendations of optimal strategies to deal with specific 
threats are also extracted from these sources to serve as 
guidelines in operations.  
 
For the second phase, we justify several use cases to validate 
the framework in practice. Each use case involves specific 
assets and transporting entities, while assessing their relevant 
threats and attacks. We select the profiles from the first phase 
that fit the use case requirements. Both simulations and real-
world trials were conducted to collect the training data for the 
corresponding assessment models. Accidental and attack 
scenarios arHLPSOHPHQWHGWRYDOLGDWHWKHV\VWHP¶VFDSDELOLW\
to react to safety and security threats respectively. We also 
focus on how the different profiles related and give deeper 
understanding of the risks, which helps the PODs to make 
more optimal decisions. 
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Figure 2: Applying the proposed framework in the CAPRI project 
6 Conclusions and Future Work 
This paper introduced a novel dynamic risk management 
framework to assess the risks from different views and system 
levels, based on risk knowledge represented through risk 
profiles. The framework provides a continuous cycle of 
selecting relevant risk profiles, training and updating 
assessment models, and managing the data sources 
effectively. The risk profiles can be adapted to varied 
stakHKROGHUV¶ needs, while capable of dealing with run-time 
requirement to support on-road decision  making. The risk 
profile is also an effective concept in solving the challenges to 
make the most use of the IoT data. We also considered the 
practice of this framework by demonstrating a case study, 
which consider the risk assessment for the innovative 
autonomous PODs.  
 
In the future, we aim at implementing the POD use cases to 
verify and validate the framework, and to improve the 
effectiveness of the dynamic profile selection, the IoT data 
management, and the reaction system. Another interesting 
aspect to explore is whether the system can predict the 
unknown threats, given that it has advances in updating and 
viewing the risks from different angles. An effective decision 
support tool for managing the CAV risks can also be 
developed based on the proposed framework. 
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